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Abstract: Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as corporate activities and their 7 
impacts on different social groups. In this paper, CSR is considered in a two-echelon supply 8 
chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale 9 
price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is 10 
gauged by a global variable and the associated cost of achieving this CSR performance is only 11 
incurred by the supplier with an expectation of being shared with the downstream firm via the 12 
wholesale price contract. As such, the key issue is to determine who should be allocated as the 13 
responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract and how this right should be 14 
appropriately restricted. Game-theoretical analyses are carried out on six games, resulting from 15 
different interaction schemes between the supplier and the firm, to derive their corresponding 16 
equilibriums. Comparative institutional analyses are then conducted to determine the optimal 17 
social responsibility allocations based on both economic and CSR performance criteria. Main 18 
results are furnished in a series of propositions and their implications to the real-world business 19 
practice are discussed. The key findings are threefold: Under the current model settings, (1) the 20 
optimal allocation scheme is to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate 21 
restrictions on the corresponding rights to determine the wholesale price; (2) Inherent conflict 22 
exists between the economic and CSR performance criteria and, hence, the two maxima cannot 23 
be achieved simultaneously; (3) Although integrative channel profit is not attainable, the system-24 
wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal social responsibility allocation schemes. 25 
Keywords: Supply chain management; corporate social responsibility; wholesale price contracts; 26 
equilibrium. 27 
1 Introduction 28 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as corporate activities and their impacts on 29 
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different social groups, including human rights, environment protection (e.g. recycling used 30 
product), pollutant emission control, philanthropy, to name a few (Cater and Jennings 2002). 31 
CSR has been receiving considerable attention in the academic community, from the CSR 32 
construct in the 1950s (Bowen 1953) to empirical investigations on the relationship between 33 
CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP)1 and, then, to formal modeling of CSR (Baron 34 
2001, 2007, Calveras et al. 2007, Giovanni and Giacinta 2007). In recent years, with the 35 
continued trend of globalization, the research on supply chain management has enabled firms to 36 
improve their profitability by fostering partnership with other members in their supply chain 37 
systems. While firms enjoy improved efficiency, pressures are also accumulating for socially and 38 
environmentally responsible supply chain practice (Linton et al. 2007). For instance, many 39 
leading brands such as Nike, GAP, Adidas, and McDonalds have been urged to incorporate social 40 
responsibility into their supply chains (Amaeshi et al. 2008). In response to this pressure, many 41 
supply chain primary firms have introduced codes of conduct to ensure their partners’ business 42 
practices to be socially responsible. However, World Bank (2003) reports that implementing 43 
codes of conduct is challenged by a plethora of individual CSR codes, the effectiveness of the 44 
top-down CSR strategies and insufficient understanding of business benefits. 45 
Note that even if a lobby group (e.g., non-governmental organizations) for social 46 
responsibility may only target a particular firm in a supply chain, the pressure can be easily 47 
propagated to other members in the system through their business transactions. Therefore, it is 48 
necessary to extend the traditional CSR beyond a single firm’s boundary and consider it within a 49 
supply chain context (Davis et al. 1997; Mamic 2005). Recent research has started to model 50 
social responsibility in supply chain operations. For instance, Savaskan et al. (2004) develop a 51 
model for closed-loop supply chains with product remanufacturing and identify an appropriate 52 
supply chain structure for original equipment manufacturers. Crutz (2008) introduces a dynamic 53 
multi-criteria decision-making framework for modeling and analyzing the equilibrium of supply 54 
chain network with environmental responsibility where environmental (social) responsibility is 55 
assumed to have no direct impact on market demand and the allocation of environmental (social) 56 
responsibility is not explicitly considered. In Hsueh and Chang’s (2008) three-tier (manufacturer, 57 
distributor and retailer) supply chain network model, the allocation of CSR for system-wide 58 
optimization is captured by additional monetary transfers (via an enforceable agreement), and 59 
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this treatment allows for the assumption of each decentralized manufacturer’s marginal 60 
production cost to be the same as that in the centralized network. For empirical studies, Carter et 61 
al. (2000) show that environmental purchasing has significant impacts on both income and cost. 62 
Cater and Jennings (2002) find a positive relationship between CSR and supplier performance. 63 
Although these studies attempt to incorporate social responsibility into supply chain 64 
management, the allocation of social reasonability has not emerged as a main focus, whereas it is 65 
a critical issue for supply chain members to collaboratively manage the extended CSR. As 66 
OECD (2001) states, “allocating responsibility and determining who is the producer [the 67 
responsibility holder] are two of the most important [EPR, Extended Producer Responsibility] 68 
policy issues.” On the one hand, the principles of corporate legal personality and separate 69 
existence of corporations naturally reject the extension of the responsibility of one member to 70 
any others. In this respect, all members in a supply chain are responsible for only their own 71 
actions. But on the other hand, the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) argues that each supply 72 
chain member shares the responsibility for other members’ actions. Now a natural question is 73 
how to handle social responsibility in the context of a supply chain: is social responsibility 74 
independent for individual firms or shared among different entities? This article follows the 75 
second argument and treats social responsibility as shared obligations among supply chain 76 
partners. In this case, it is crucial to know how the responsibility is allocated among the firms. 77 
Otherwise, unclear allocation is likely to lead to the “tragedy of the commons” and result in 78 
lower supply chain efficiency. As an example, Amaeshi et al. (2008) suggest that the more 79 
powerful member in a firm-supplier relationship should bear the responsibility to influence the 80 
less powerful one(s). 81 
This research aims to address the social responsibility allocation problem in a two-echelon 82 
supply chain under wholesale price contracts. The basic settings of the model are outlined as 83 
follows: a two-echelon supply chain consists of two members, an upstream supplier (S) and a 84 
downstream firm (F). The investment in CSR always incurs by the supplier, which provides a 85 
global measurement of the CSR performance for the supply chain and is assumed to be 86 
independent of the production quantity2. This cost is then shared with the firm via a wholesale 87 
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are often accused of inhumane labor and business practices in its Asian manufacturing facilities (Amaeshi et al. 2008). As the 
largest specialty apparel retailer, GAP admits to the charge of its substandard working conditions in as many as 3000 of its 
factories (Merrick 2004). Moreover, CSR activity such as human rights and philanthropy are almost irrelevant to production 
quantity. Xiao and Yang (2008) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) make this same assumption in their research as well. 
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price contract3  that is an increasing function of CSR investment by the supplier4. Three power 88 
structures are entertained, F as the Stackelberg leader (first mover) and S as the follower (second 89 
mover), S as the Stakelberg leader (first mover) and F as the follower (second mover), or F and S 90 
are equally powerful and, hence, move simultaneously (Choi 1991). Then, our allocation 91 
problem is to determine who should be entrusted with the right of offering the wholesale price 92 
contract to enforce social responsibility in the supply chain (hereafter, referred to as the 93 
responsibility holder) under each of the three power structures. Depending on whether F or S is 94 
the social responsibility holder and which power structure is considered, six scenarios may arise. 95 
Game-theoretical analyses are first conducted to obtain the equilibriums for the six cases. The 96 
allocation decisions are subsequently assessed based on both economic and CSR performance 97 
criteria by employing the methodology of comparative institutional analysis that is widely 98 
adopted in institutional economics literature (Coase 1960; Williamson 1985). For the economic 99 
performance criterion, the system-wide profit is chosen as a proxy of efficiency to determine the 100 
optimal allocation scheme, and this choice is consistent with the concept of strategic CSR (Baron 101 
2001). For the CSR performance criterion, the optimal allocation decision is obtained by 102 
maximizing the global CSR performance for the supply chain. 103 
Our model is related to Gurnani et el. (2007), Xiao and Yang (2008) and Tsay and Agrawal 104 
(2000) in the following two aspects. First, our CSR-sensitive demand is similar to the quality-105 
sensitive demand in Gurnani et el. (2007) and the service-sensitive demand in Xiao and Yang 106 
(2008) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000). Second, for our CSR cost function, Xiao and Yang (2008) 107 
and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) assume service cost functions in the same quadratic form that is 108 
independent of selling quantity, while Gurnani et el. (2007) introduce a quality cost function with 109 
both sales-irrelevant and sales-relevant components. In the aforesaid research, the authors focus 110 
on equilibrium variables such as quality/service levels, prices, sales and profits, and it is not a 111 
concern how different arrangements of quality/service pricing right affect the supply chain 112 
system-wide profit (or efficiency). In this paper, we investigate both equilibrium variables (if 113 
CSR were viewed as quality/service level) and the impact of different allocation schemes.  114 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the basic model and 115 
the corresponding equilibriums. Section 4 reports our main results, followed by some discussions 116 
                                                 
3 We use wholesale price contracts because they are commonly observed in practice (Cachon 2003).  
4 For example, the Starbucks’ sustainability conversion and performance price premiums ($0.05 per pound) in its CAFÉ program 
demand a host of socially responsible practices (Lee et al. 2007). 
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in Section 5. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 117 
2 The Model 118 
Consider a supply chain with two members, an upstream supplier S and a downstream firm 119 
F. The global CSR performance of the supply chain is measured by a variable y 5. To achieve this 120 
CSR performance level, certain investment has to be committed. Assume that this cost only 121 
incurs by the supplier (but will be shared with the firm F via a wholesale price contract) and 122 
takes a quadratic form6: 2/)( 2cyyC  , which is independent of the production quantity. In addition 123 
to the social cost, a constant unit production cost c0 is also incurred by S. The social 124 
responsibility commitment by S is expected to be compensated by F through a wholesale price 125 
contract that stipulates F to purchase product from S at a unit social-performance dependent 126 
wholesale price )(yw : 127 
0( ) ,w y w ky                                                                     (1) 128 
where 0 0w   is a component that is independent of CSR performance, and 0k   represents the 129 
marginal impact of CSR performance on the wholesale price.  130 
Given a CSR performance level y, the larger the k value, the more F is taking on the social 131 
responsibility for the supply chain. When k is zero, all social responsibility for the supply chain 132 
will be solely assumed by S. On the other hand, when k approaches infinity, all social 133 
responsibility will be shifted to F. Therefore, it is reasonable to put a cap k on k to make the 134 
contract implementable. It is obvious that the wholesale price in (1) serves as a mechanism to 135 
share the social responsibility between S and F and k plays a crucial role in achieving an 136 
equitable transfer of social cost from S to F. Two key issues in allocating social responsibility 137 
between the supply chain members S and F are who should be entrusted with the right of 138 
offering the wholesale price contract and what upper limit k  should be placed on k.  139 
F then sells the product in a consumer market characterized by a demand function 140 
1( ) ,
2
p A y bq                                                                      (2) 141 
where 0p   and 0q   are the price and the demand quantity, respectively, 0b   indicates the slope 142 
                                                 
5 CSR performance can be measured by investment in CSR activities such as mitigating pollutant emission, improving working 
conditions, philanthropic donations. 
6 Röller (1990) theoretically shows that a quadratic cost function can behave well for analyzing global cost concepts (e.g. 
diminishing marginal returns) by properly choosing the parameters. In addition, quadratic cost functions are employed in many 
application studies (see, for example, Perry and Porter 1985, Rath and Zhao 2001, Kwoka 2002). Particularly, in the OM/OR area, 
Tsay and Agrawal (2000), Gurnani et el. (2007), Xiao and Yang (2008) also make this assumption for their cost function. 
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of the demand curve, )(yA  characterizes the impact of CSR performance (denoted by 0y  ) on 143 
the final consumer market and is assumed to take the following form 144 
0( ) ,A y a ay                                                                       (3) 145 
where 0 0a   captures the base willingness-to-pay from consumers, and 0a   stands for the 146 
marginal impact of CSR performance on additional willingness-to-pay. This assumption is 147 
consistent with Mohr and Webb’s (2005) empirical results from a national sample that CSR has a 148 
positive impact on consumer purchase intent. 149 
With these assumptions, the profit function for F is given as 150 
0 0
1( , , ) ( ) ( ) .
2
F q y k a ay bq q w ky q       151 
Similarly, the profit for S is 152 
2
0 0
1( , , ) ( ) .
2
S q y k w ky q c q cy      153 
Furthermore, we assume 00 cw   for the sake of analytical tractability 7  and denote 154 
000000  cawaA  for notational simplification, then we have 155 
2
0
1( , , ) ( ) ,
2
F q y k A ay ky q bq                                                         (4) 156 
21( , , ) .
2
S q y k kyq cy                                                               (5) 157 
The channel profit of the supply chain system is thus derived as 158 
2 2
0
1 1( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) .
2 2
T F Sq y q y k q y k A ay q bq cy                                    (6) 159 
Now F and S are treated as two economic agents. Following Choi (1991), the bargaining 160 
power in the supply chain is characterized by the Stackelberg leadership model. Three scenarios 161 
may arise: (1) Upstream Stackelberg (US) where S has more bargaining power than F and, hence, 162 
takes the first move; (2) Downstream Stackelberg (DS) where F has more bargaining power than 163 
S and, hence, moves first; and (3) Vertical Nash (VN) where S and F have equal bargaining 164 
power and, hence, move simultaneously.  165 
According to the duality of rights and obligations (responsibilities), the responsibility holder 166 
                                                 
7 The key motivation of assuming 0 0w c  is to exclude the impact of production cost on the supplier’s CSR decision so that we 
can isolate the supplier’s CSR behavior and focus on examining how CSR commitments affect supply chain operations, and 
eventually analyze the impacts of different CSR allocation schemes on the efficiency of the whole supply chain (the system-wide 
profit).  
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is assumed to have the right of offering a wholesale price contract ],0[ kk  , where ),0( k  167 
describes how strong the right corresponds to the social responsibility. Understandably, the 168 
greater k  is, the larger the margin of wholesale price contracts from which the responsibility 169 
holder is allowed to choose, corresponding to a stronger right for the responsibility holder. Given 170 
this interpretation, if the social responsibility is allocated to F, it will offer to S a wholesale price 171 
by selecting ],0[ kk   and also order q  units such that its profit F  is maximized and S, in this 172 
case, will choose y  to maximize its own profit S ; on the other hand, if S is allocated as the 173 
social responsibility holder, it will offer to F a contract characterized by k  and determine a CSR 174 
performance level y  to maximize S  and F will thus select q  to maximize F . Therefore, the 175 
allocation of social responsibility is twofold: who is the responsibility holder to offer k and what 176 
cap k  is placed on k. This allocation decision can thus be depicted by ),0(},{),(  SFkX . As for 177 
the timing of the k decision, the base model in Sections 3 and 4 assumes that it is made at the 178 
same time as the other decision variable controlled by the responsibility holder. Section 5, on the 179 
other hand, examines the situation that k is offered by the responsibility holder prior to the other 180 
two decision variables q and y are determined by F and S, respectively. 181 
Finally, by combining the choice of a responsibility holder (F or S) and a power structure 182 
(US, DS, or VN), six scenarios arise and are hereafter labeled as S-US, S-DS, S-VN, F-US, F-DS, 183 
and F-VN games, respectively, where the first letter indicates the responsibility holder and the 184 
last two letters identify the power structure. For instance, in the S-US game, the supplier S is the 185 
responsibility holder and the Stackelberg leader and, hence, S is entitled to choose k  as a 186 
responsibility holder and determines its variable y  first as a Stackelberg leader, subsequently, F 187 
as the Stackelberg follower responds with q  to the choices by S. The other five labels can be 188 
interpreted in a similar fashion. Next, the six games are examined and their equilibriums are 189 
obtained. 190 
3 Equilibriums 191 
To make the following analysis meaningful, assume bca 2   to guarantee the system-wide optimal 192 
profit and CSR performance for the supply chain to be greater than zero. 193 
The integrative case 194 
First the integrative case is considered with social responsibility. The first-order conditions 195 
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are8 196 
0( ) 0,A ay bq    197 
0.aq cy   198 
Solving these two equations simultaneously yields 199 
2
0*
abc
aA
yI  ; 
* 0
2 .I
A cq
bc a
   200 
The maximum profit of the supply chain system is 201 
2
* 0
2 .2( )
I
A c
bc a
    202 
When social responsibility is not considered in the model with all terms associated with y 203 
being removed, the optimal quantity and system-wide profit can be conveniently obtained as 204 
follows 205 
b
A
qN
0*  ; 
2
* 0 .
2N
A
b
   206 
The S-US game 207 
In the S-US game, the supplier S offers the wholesale price contract ( k ) and chooses y , 208 
then the firm F responds with an order q . By backward induction, from (4), the optimal reaction 209 
function for F is 210 
0 ( )( , ) .
A a k yq y k
b
                                                            (7) 211 
Then the supplier’s profit function can be rewritten as 212 
2
20 ( ) 1( ( , ), , ) .
2
S
S US
A ky a k kyq y k y k cy
b
                                                (8) 213 
Clearly, this profit function is concave both in y  for a given k  and in k  for a given y , 214 
thereby validating Zabel’s (1970) method of first optimizing y  for a given k  and searching over 215 
the resulting optimal trajectory to find the optimal k . The first-order condition with respect to y  216 
is 217 
0 02( ) 0 ( ) .
2 ( )
S
S US A k a k ky A kcy y k
y b bc k a k
                                             (9) 218 
Substituting (9) into (8) and taking the first-order derivative with respect to k  yield 219 
                                                 
8 The second order condition is easy to check. For remaining discussions, all second order conditions can be checked in a 
straightforward manner and, hence, are omitted in the article. 
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 0
d (( ( ( ), ), ( ), )) ( )( ) .
d 2 ( )
S
S US q y k k y k k A y k bc ak
k b bc k a k
     220 
Note that 2 2 2 22 ( ) 2 2 2 ( )bc k a k bc ka k bc ka k a k bc a            . Due to the aforesaid 221 
assumption 2a bc , it is confirmed that the denominator is positive. Therefore, the first-order 222 
derivative is positive, or equivalently, SS US  increases in k , for all abck / , and SS US  decreases in 223 
k  for all /k bc a . This indicates that SS US  is unimodal in k . So, if k is capped before SS US  reaches 224 
its maximum at /k bc a , i.e., for all /k bc a , the optimal wholesale price contract will occur at 225 
the boundary, *S USk k  . Otherwise, if the cap for k is extended beyond /k bc a , i.e., for all abck / , 226 
* /S USk bc a  . Plugging the optimal *S USk   into (9), (7), (4), (5) and (6), we can calculate the 227 
equilibrium CSR performance ( *S USy  ) and product quantity ( *S USq  ), as well as the equilibrium 228 
profits for the firm, the supplier, and the supply chain system. These equilibrium variables are 229 
summarized in Proposition 1. 230 
Proposition 1: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the S-US game is summarized as 231 
(i) If /k bc a , the equilibrium variables are 232 
*
S USk k  ; * 02 ( )S US
A k
y
bc k a k
   ; 
0*
( )
;
2 ( )S US
A bc k a k
q
b bc k a k
       
 233 
2 2
* 0
2 2 ( )
S
S US
A k
b bc k a k
     
; 
22
0*
2
( )
2 2 ( )
F
S US
A bc k a k
b bc k a k

        
; 
2
2 2
* 0
2
( )
.
2 2 ( ) 2 ( )
T
S US
bc k a kA k
b bc k a k bc k a k

              
 234 
(ii) If abck / , the equilibrium variables are 235 
* /S USk bc a  ; * 0 22S US
A ay
bc a
  ; 
* 0
2 ;2S US
A cq
bc a
   236 
)2(2 2
2
0*
abc
cAS
USS   ; 22
22
0*
)2(2 abc
bcAF
USS   ; 
2 2
* 0
2 2
(3 )
.
2(2 )
T
S US
A c bc a
bc a
    237 
The F-US game 238 
The F-US game is similar to the S-US case except that F rather than S offers the wholesale 239 
price contract characterized by k. Given y  from S, F determines k  and q  to maximize 240 
( , , ) ( , , )F FF US q y k q y k   . If S sets 0y , the profit for F will only depend on q , and the first-order 241 
condition with respect to q  immediately implies that, for any ],0[ kk  , F orders bAq /0  with a 242 
maximal profit 20 0( , , ) ( / ,0, ) / (2 )F FF US q y k A b k A b    . As y = 0 in this case, k becomes irrelevant. 243 
Therefore, although k may assume any value between 0 and k , for convenience, we set it at 244 
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0)( yk  to break ties. On the other hand, if S commits to 0y , for any 0q , ( , , )FF US q y k  strictly 245 
decreases in k , then the optimal wholesale price contract is 0k , and the corresponding optimal 246 
order is given as bayAq /)( 0  . In this case, 20 0( , , ) (( ) / , ,0) ( ) / (2 ) 0F FF US q y k A ay b y A ay b       . In 247 
addition, 0y  and 0q  together imply that ( , , ) (0, , ) 0F FF US q y k y k     for any 0k . Thus, the 248 
optimal reaction to 0y  can be expressed as bayAq /)( 0   and 0k . In summary, the optimal 249 
reaction from F is 250 
0( ( ), ( )) ,0 .
A ay
q y k y
b
                                                              (10) 251 
By backward induction, the profit function for S is rewritten as ( ) ( ( ), , ( ))S SF US y q y y k y   , where 252 
)(yq and )(yk are given in (10). If S chooses 0y , then its profit becomes 0( ) ( / ,0,0) 0.S SF US y A b     253 
But if it selects 0y , its profit is 0( ) (( ) / , ,0)S SF US y A ay b y      2 / 2 0cy  . Thus, the optimal 254 
decision for S is * 0F USy   . Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-US game can be 255 
obtained as shown in Proposition 2. 256 
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-US game can be summarized as 257 
* 0F USk   ; * 0F USy   ; * 0 ;F US Aq b   258 
 * 0SF US  ; 
2
* 0
2
F
F US
A
b
  ; 
2
* 0 .
2
T
F US
A
b
   259 
The S-DS game 260 
In the S-DS game, F chooses q  first and, then given q , S reacts with k  and y  to maximize 261 
( , , ) ( , , )S SS DS q y k q y k   . Once again, backward induction is employed to obtain its equilibrium. First, 262 
if F orders 0q , it becomes trivial with 0y  and 'k k  by S, where 'k is a real number 263 
arbitrarily picked from ],0[ kk  . On the other hand, if 0q , the optimal reaction ),( yk  by S must 264 
satisfy the first-order condition with respect to y , i.e. cykq  .  Notice that 0k  implies 0y , 265 
thereby ( ,0,0) 0SS DS q  . Note further that 0k  means 0y , and it follows that 266 
( , , ) / 0SS DS q y k k yq    , indicating that the profit for S strictly increases in k and, hence, reaches its 267 
maximum at k . In addition, for all 0),( yk  with cykq  , 2( , , ) ( ) / (2 ) 0SS DS q y k kq c   . Therefore, the 268 
optimal reaction ),( yk to 0q  is )/,( cqkk . To summarize, the reaction function from S is 269 
expressed as 270 
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( ',0),         if 0
( ( ), ( ))
( , ),    if 0
k q
k q y q kqk q
c
  
.                                                    (11) 271 
Given (11), if the firm chooses 0q , its profit is ( ) ( , ( ), ( )) 0F FS DS q q y q k q    . For 0q , its 272 
profit function can be rewritten as 273 
2
0
( )( ) ( , ( ), ( ))
2
F F
S DS
k a k bq q y q k q A q q
c
        
. 274 
Due to the assumption 2 0a bc  , 2 2 22 ( ) 2 2 ( ) 0k a k bc ak k bc a k a bc           , so ( )FS DS q  is 275 
concave. The first-order condition with respect to q  immediately yields 276 
* 0
2 ( )S DS
A c
q
bc k a k
   . 277 
Finally, given that * 0S DSq    as its denominator and numerator are positive, the optimal 278 
response ( ( ), ( ))k q y q  from S can be easily obtained from (11). Plugging them into (4), (5) and (6), 279 
one can determine the equilibrium profit for S, F, and the supply chain system. All equilibrium 280 
variables of the S-DS game can thus be furnished as Proposition 3 below. 281 
Proposition 3: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the S-DS game can be summarized as 282 
*
S DSk k  ; * 02 ( )S DS
A k
y
bc k a k
   ; 
* 0
2 ( )S DS
A c
q
bc k a k
   ; 283 
2 2
* 0
2
2 2 ( )
S
S DS
A ck
bc k a k
     
; 
2
* 0
2 2 ( )
F
S DS
A c
bc k a k
     
;  2 20* 22 3
2 2 ( )
T
S DS
A c bc ka k
bc k a k

  
   
. 284 
The F-DS game 285 
In the F-DS game, F chooses k  and q  first, followed by S selecting y  to maximize 286 
( , , ) ( , , )S SF DS q y k q y k    under the given k  and q . The reaction function for S is thus 287 
c
kqqky ),( .                                                           (12) 288 
Given (12), the profit function for F is 289 
2
0
( )( , ) ( , ( , ), )
2
F F
F DS
k a k bq k q y k q k A q q
c
         .                           (13) 290 
 This profit function is concave both in q  for a given k  and in k  for a given 0q , 291 
permitting the application of Zabel’s (1970) method for optimization. Next, we first optimize q  292 
for a given k  and, then find the optimal k . From the first-order condition with respect to q , we 293 
have 294 
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)(2
)( 0
kakbc
cA
kq  .                                                        (14) 295 
Substituting (14) into (13) and taking the derivative with respect to k  yield 296 
 2( 2 ) ( )FF DS a k q k
k c
   . 297 
This indicates that FF DS  increases in k  for 2/ak   and decreases in k if 2/ak   and, hence, 298 
F
F DS  is unimodal. Thus, *F DSk k   if 2/ak  , otherwise * / 2F DSk a  . By (14), (12), (4), (5) and (6), 299 
we can determine the equilibrium variables as shown in Proposition 4. 300 
Proposition 4: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-DS game can be summarized as 301 
(i) If 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are the same as those in the S-DS game; 302 
(ii) If 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are 303 
*
2F DS
ak   ; * 0 22F DS
A ay
bc a
  ; 
* 0
2
2
2F DS
A cq
bc a
  ; 304 
2 2
* 0
2 22(2 )
S
F DS
A a c
bc a
   ; 
2
* 0
22
F
F DS
A c
bc a
   ; 
 
 
2 2
0*
22
4
2 2
T
F DS
A c bc a
bc a

 

. 305 
The S-VN game 306 
Under the assumption of the S-VN game, S and F determine their variables simultaneously, 307 
where S furnishes k  and y   and F provides a quantity q . It is easy to verify that (7) and (11) are 308 
the reaction functions for F and S, respectively. If 0q , (11) implies that 0y  and k  is arbitrary, 309 
but (7) indicates that 0/),0( 0  bAkq . This means that q  cannot be zero in the equilibrium. For 310 
0q , (11) implies that kk  and cqky / . Substituting these two equations into (7) and solving 311 
it for q, one can have 312 
* 0
( )S VN
A cq
bc k a k
   . 313 
With this result, it is straightforward to derive other variables in the equilibrium as given in 314 
the following proposition. 315 
Proposition 5: The Nash equilibrium of the S-VN game can be summarized as 316 
*
S VNk k  ; * 0( )S VN
A ky
bc k a k
   ; 
* 0
( )S VN
A c
q
bc k a k
   ; 317 
2 2
* 0
2
2 ( )
S
S VN
A ck
bc k a k
     
; 
)]([2
2
0*
kakbc
cAF
VNS   ; 
 2 20*
2
2
2[ ( )]
T
S VN
A c bc ka k
bc k a k
     . 318 
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The F-VN game 319 
In the F-VN game, F determines k  and q  at the same time as S gives y . Clearly, (10) and 320 
(12) are the reaction functions for F and S, respectively. (10) and (12) are next solved 321 
simultaneously. If 0y , we have bAq /0  from (10), and (12) further implies 0k . Thus, 322 
)0,/,0(),,( 0 bAyqk   is a Nash equilibrium for the F-VN game. It is actually the unique Nash 323 
equilibrium. As a matter of fact, if 0y , (10) implies that 0k  and 0/)( 0  bayAq , 324 
contradictory to (12). Therefore, )0,/,0(),,( 0 bAyqk   is the unique triplet that satisfies both (10) 325 
and (12) simultaneously, leading to the following proposition. 326 
Proposition 6: The Nash equilibrium of the F-VN game can be summarized as 327 
* 0F VNk   ; * 0F VNy   ; * 0F VN Aq b  ; 328 
* 0SF VN  ; 
2
* 0
2
F
F VN
A
b
  ;
2
* 0
2
T
F VN
A
b
  . 329 
Remark: Propositions 1-6 demonstrate that the power structure has a significant impact on the 330 
behavior of the responsibility holder. If a supply chain member is entrusted as a responsibility 331 
holder who offers the wholesale price contract characterized by k, it seems to behave in an 332 
equitable manner only if it assumes the leadership position.  On the one hand, if responsibility 333 
holder S is the Stackelberg leader, corresponding to the S-US case, it will always share social 334 
responsibility with F at an optimal level of * /S USk bc a   if /k bc a  or *S USk k   if /k bc a . Similarly, 335 
if responsibility holder F is the Stackelberg leader in the F-DS case, F will offer * / 2F DSk a   to take 336 
its share in achieving the equilibrium CSR performance level.  On the other hand, if social 337 
responsibility of the supply chain is allocated to S, but it is not the Stackelberg leader in the S-DS 338 
or S-VN case, S will always push the k value to its maximum, i.e., *S DSk k   or *S VNk k  . If there is 339 
no restriction on k , i.e., k  , S will not pull its weight but transfer all of its social 340 
responsibility investment to F via the wholesale price contract. This observation indicates that 341 
the right of offering k for S should come with a restriction on the upper limit of k, which may be 342 
imposed by a third party, for instance, a government agency, or through  a negotiation between 343 
the supply chain partners so that social responsibility is indeed equitably shared. In a similar 344 
fashion, one can examine the cases that F is the responsibility holder but not the Stackelberg 345 
leader in the F-US or F-VN games. In both cases, F sets * 0k   and refuses to share any CSR 346 
investment with S, eventually leading to no CSR performance for the supply chain ( * 0F USy    and 347 
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* 0F VNy   ). This result shows the other side of the coin: when F is entrusted as the responsibility 348 
holder to determine the wholesale price, a lower bound should be placed on k  to ensure a 349 
reasonable transfer of social responsibility cost from S so that the undesirable case of zero CSR 350 
performance is avoided for the supply chain. Once again, this lower limit could be imposed by a 351 
third party or negotiated between F and S.  352 
In summary, the equilibrium value of the parameter k  characterizes how CSR investment is 353 
expected to be shared between S and F, and the CSR investment tends to be shared in an 354 
equitable manner if the Stackelberg leader is allocated to decide k . Intuitively, in the US and DS 355 
cases, the leader’s profit depends on the follower’s response (or threat) and the leader is thus able 356 
to take advantage of its leadership position to stimulate (or guide) the follower by choosing a 357 
reasonable k  to equitably share the CSR investment. On the contrary, if the follower is entrusted 358 
with the right of selecting k , it knows that its decision on k  will be final as the leader has 359 
already committed to its actions. As such, the follower does not have any economic incentive to 360 
pull its weight. In the VN case, neither stimulation nor threat is possible because S and F have to 361 
move simultaneously without any prior knowledge of commitments from their partner. Therefore, 362 
each party with the right of determining k, in its best economic interests, pushes k towards its 363 
boundary ( k  in Proposition 5 and 0 in Proposition 6), thereby forcing its partner to take on as 364 
much CSR investment cost as possible. 365 
4 Main results 366 
This section analyzes the equilibriums and derives the optimal allocation of social responsibility 367 
according to the methodology of comparative institutional analysis. Implications on business 368 
practice are also explored for the resulting social responsibility allocation scheme within a 369 
supply chain management context. 370 
4.1 Optimal responsibility allocations based on the economic performance criterion 371 
In Section 3, equilibriums are obtained by examining each supply chain member’s strategic 372 
behavior under each of the six aforesaid scenarios. In equilibrium, each member has chosen its 373 
optimal strategy to maximize its own profit. Here, we shall employ the comparative institutional 374 
analysis approach to investigate the equilibriums and determine the optimal social responsibility 375 
allocation scheme that maximizes the total equilibrium profit for the channel under each of the 376 
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three power structures9. 377 
The US case 378 
From Proposition 1, we have 379 
2
2 2
0
2
*
2 2
0
2 2
( )
,      if    
2 2 ( ) 2 ( )( )
(3 ) ,                                               if   
2(2 )
T
S US
bc k a kA k bck
b bc k a k abc k a kk
A c bc a bck
bc a a

                     
. 380 
For all ]/,0( abck  , we have 381 
 2 4 2 3 2 2 2* 20 0
3 3
2 2 ( )d ( )
d 2 ( ) 2 ( )
T
S US
A ak a k bc a bc k ab c A F k
k b bc k a k b bc k a k
       
         
.          (15) 382 
where 222324 )(22)( cabkbcabckakakF  . 383 
Then )(68)( 2223 bcabckakakF   and )2(12)( kakakF  . It follows that )(kF   increases for 384 
]2/,0( ak   and decreases for ),2/(  ak . Thus )(kF   is unimodal in k  and attains its maximum at 385 
2/ak   over ),0(  . Note that 0)(2/)2/( 24  bcabcaaF  due to the assumption 2a bc , therefore, 386 
0)(  kF  for all ),0( k . Further, as 0)0( 22  cabF  and 3( ) 0F a a bc   , it implies that there exists a 387 
unique )/,0(),0(* abcake   such that 0)( * ekF , 0)( kF  for *ekk   and 0)( kF  for *ekk  . Thus (15) 388 
implies that *d / d 0TS US k   at *ekk  , *d / d 0TS US k   for *ekk   and *d / d 0TS US k   for *ekk  . Therefore, *TS US  is 389 
unimodal in k  and attains its maximum at *ekk   over ),0(  . 390 
Proposition 2 indicates that any k  always leads to the same constant equilibrium channel 391 
profit for the F-US game, hence, 392 
2 2 2
* * * *0 0( ) 1 ( ) ( )
2 2
T T T
F US S US S US e
A A ak a k
b b bc  
          
, for any ),0( k . 393 
Therefore, ),( *ekS  is the unique optimal responsibility allocation in the US case, meaning that 394 
S will be allocated as the responsibility holder with the right to choose ],0[ ** ee kkk   when S is the 395 
upstream Stackelberg leader. 396 
The DS case 397 
From Proposition 3, we have 398 
                                                 
9  The comparative institutional analysis (Williamson 1985) suggests that transaction cost savings (efficiency 
enhancement) via actors’ rational behavior drive the evolution of institutions. As such, comparative efficiency 
advantages dominate the choice of institutions. Applying this idea to our study, to determine who should be allocated 
the right of offering a wholesale price contract, a rational recommendation is the one who is able to achieve higher 
system-wide profit for the supply chain.  
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 2 3 2 2* 20 0
3 3
6 6 (2 )d ( )
d 2 ( ) 2 ( )
T
S DS
A c k ak a bc k abc A cG k
k bc k a k bc k a k
       
         
,               (16) 399 
where 3 2 2( ) 6 6 (2 )G k k ak a bc k abc      . 400 
As 2 2 2( ) 18 12 (2 ) 2(3 ) 0G k k ak a bc k a bc           , 0)(  kG  for all ),0( k , implying that ( )G k  401 
decreases in k  for ),0( k . Note that 2 22 2 4 4( ) ( ) (2 ) 0a bc a aG a bc a      and 2( ) 2 0G a a   , there exists a 402 
unique **
2( , )
a
ek a  such that 0)( ** ekG , 0)( kG  for **ekk   and ( ) 0G k   for **ekk  . It follows from (16) 403 
that *d / d 0TS DS k   at **ekk  , *d / d 0TS DS k   for **ekk   and *d / d 0TS DS k   for **ekk  . Thus *TS DS  is unimodal in 404 
k  and attains its maximum at **ekk  . 405 
From Proposition 4, we have 406 
*
*
2 2
0
2 2
( ),             if    
2
( )
(4 )
,      if   
22(2 )
T
S DS
T
F DS
ak k
k
A c bc a ak
bc a


      
.                                           (17) 407 
It is confirmed that * ( )TF DS k  is continuous in k . Given that * ( )TS DS k   increases in k  when 408 
2
ak  , (17) indicates that * ( )TF DS k  reaches its maximum at .2
ak   Therefore, for any (0, )k    409 
 2 2* * * * **0 2 2(4 )( ) 2 22(2 )T T T TF DS F DS S DS S DS eA c bc aa ak kbc a                    . 410 
Thus **( , )eS k  arises as the unique optimal responsibility allocation in the DS case. 411 
The VN case 412 
From Proposition 5, for (0, )k   , we have 413 
    3
2
0
3
2232
0
*
)(2
)(
)(2
34
d
d
kakbc
kcHA
kakbc
abckakakcA
k
T
VNS



  ,                   (18) 414 
where abckakakkH  223 34)( . 415 
Then 0)3(3612)( 2222  akkakakkH , indicating that ( )H k  decreases in k . As 416 
0)4/()2/( 2  abcaaH  and   0)( 2  bcabcabcbcH  (due to 2a bc ), there exists a unique 417 
),2/(*** bcake   such that 0)( *** ekH , 0)( kH  for ***ekk   and 0)( kH  for ***ekk  . Given that the 418 
denominator of (18) is positive, it follows that *d / d 0TS VN k   at ***ekk  , *d / d 0TS VN k   for ***ekk   and 419 
*d / d 0TS VN k   for ***ekk  . Therefore, *TS VN  is unimodal in k  and achieves its maximum at ***ekk   over 420 
),0(  . 421 
Furthermore, Proposition 6 indicates that a constant equilibrium channel profit is always 422 
attained for any k  when F is responsible for determining ],0[ kk  and, hence,  423 
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)()(
2
)(
2
)( *****
2
22
0
2
0*
e
T
VNS
T
VNS
T
VNF kacb
abcA
b
A
k   . 424 
Therefore ),( ***ekS  is the unique optimal responsibility allocation in the VN case. 425 
These results can now be summarized as Proposition 7. 426 
Proposition 7: According to the economic performance criterion, ),( *ekS , ),( **ekS  and ),( ***ekS  are 427 
the unique optimal responsibility allocation for the US, DS and VN cases, respectively. 428 
Proposition 7 furnishes the optimal allocation schemes as well as the corresponding k  429 
values at optimality under the three power structures. Next, Corollaries 1-3 further establish that 430 
it remains optimal to entrust S with the right of offering the wholesale contract over a certain 431 
range of k  values, even if they are not set at their corresponding optimality. 432 
Corollary 1: If 2/)53( 2abc  , then * *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for ),0( k ; otherwise, if 2/)53( 2abc  , there 433 
exists a unique *# ee kk   such that * *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for ],0( #ekk   and * *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for ),( #  ekk . 434 
Proof: Note that for all ),0( k , * 20( ) / (2 )TF US k A b   and * 200lim ( ) / (2 )TS USk k A b   . Earlier 435 
arguments indicate that * ( )TS US k  increases in k  for *(0, ]ek k  and decreases in k  for 436 
*( , / ]ek k bc a  and, then, stays constant at 
2 2
0
2 2
(3 )
2(2 )
A c bc a
bc a

  for / .k bc a  One can verify that  437 
 2 2 22 * *0 02 2(3 )(3 5)( ) ( ) , for any 2 22(2 )T TS US F USA c bc a Aa bcbc k ka bbc a              . 438 
Therefore, if 
2(3 5) ,
2
abc  then * *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for all (0, ).k    On the other hand, if 439 
2(3 5) ,
2
abc   there exists a unique )/,( *# abckk ee   such that * *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for all ],0( #ekk   and 440 
* *( ) ( )T TS US F USk k     for all ),( #  ekk . Corollary 1 is thus proved. 441 
Corollary 2: There exists a unique **## ee kk   such that * *( ) ( )T TS DS F DSk k     for ],0( ##ekk   and 442 
* *( ) ( )T TS DS F DSk k     for ),( ##  ekk . 443 
Proof: Since * ( )TS DS k reaches its maximum at ),2/(** aake  , then (17) implies that 444 
* ** * * *( ) ( / 2) ( / 2) ( )T T T TS DS e S DS F DS F DSk a a k           for all 2/ak  . Further, due to *lim ( ) 0TS DSk k    and the 445 
unimodality of * ( )TS DS k , it follows that there is a unique **## ee kk   such that * *( ) ( )T TS DS F DSk k     for all 446 
),0( ##ekk   and * *( ) ( )T TS DS F DSk k     for all ),( ##  ekk . Corollary 2 is then proved. 447 
Corollary 3: There exists a unique ***### ee kk   such that  * *( ) ( )T TS VN F VNk k     for ],0( ###ekk   and 448 
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* *( ) ( )T TS VN F VNk k     for ),( ###  ekk . 449 
Proof: it is trivial to verify that *lim ( ) 0TS VNk k    and * 200lim ( ) / (2 )TS VNk k A b    = 450 
* ( )TF VN k for all (0, )k   . Then the unique maximum of * ( )TS VN k  at ),2/(*** bcake   implies that part 451 
(iii) holds. Corollary 3 is thus proved. 452 
Remark: Under the basic model setting that CSR performance-related cost incurs only by the 453 
supplier, to maximize the channel profit of the supply chain, Proposition 7 indicates that the right 454 
to price CSR performance via a wholesale price contract should be allocated to the supplier 455 
regardless of the power structure. The corresponding optimal k  values are derived therein for the 456 
three power structures, US, DS, and VN, respectively. When k  is set at a value other than its 457 
optimality, Corollaries 1-3 further reveal a range of values within which it remains optimal to 458 
allocate the right to S for each of the three power structures. Except for the US case with 459 
2(3 5) / 2bc a   where it is always better, in terms of system-wide profit, to allocate the right to 460 
S, Corollaries 1-3 highlight the importance of placing appropriate caps on k  ( # ## ###, ,e e ek k k ): within 461 
these limits, the system-wide profit will be higher if the right is allocated to S; once these 462 
thresholds are exceeded, it would be better to entrust the right to F. Intuitively, if S’s right of 463 
pricing CSR performance into a wholesale price contract is not appropriately restricted, it tends 464 
to abuse the right by shifting too much cost to F, thereby hurting the overall channel profitability. 465 
These results demonstrate that the responsibility holder allocation depends on how to restrict the 466 
right by placing a cap on k  rather than the power structure within a supply chain. In contrary to 467 
the suggestion of Amaeshi et al. (2008) that the more powerful member in a supply chain should 468 
be held responsible, Proposition 7 tends to partially support the argument based on the principles 469 
of corporate legal personality and separate existence of a corporation that each member is 470 
responsible for only its own activity if the right corresponding to the responsibility is 471 
appropriately restricted. Note further that given 0c  (then 0w  is fixed), the wholesale price )(yw  is 472 
determined by k  and y . Therefore, Proposition 7 indicates that, with an appropriate restriction 473 
on the right to price CSR performance, the system-wide optimal economic performance can be 474 
achieved by allocating the right to the supplier who incurs the investment in social responsibility. 475 
It is reasonable to question who controls the allocation right of the contract and how the 476 
optimal allocation scheme is implemented. Note that this research assumes that information is 477 
complete and symmetric for both parties, and the decision-makers are rational. When the channel 478 
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profit is chosen as the economic criterion for the supply chain, the comparative institutional 479 
analysis suggests that the profit maximization drives S and F to reach the optimal allocation 480 
scheme given in Proposition 7. As for the implementation issue, for the US and VN cases, it is 481 
confirmed that *** )( S USFeS USS k    and *** )( F USFeF USS k   , and ***** )( S VNFeS VNS k    and 482 
***** )( F VNFe
F
VNS k   , indicating that the optimal allocation scheme not only increases the system-483 
wide profit, but also enhances each party’s individual profitability. Therefore, the implementation 484 
of the optimal solution is not an issue as it is in the economic interest of each participant in these 485 
two cases. On the other hand, in the DS case, we have **** )( S DSFeS DSS k    and **** )( F DSFeF DSS k   , 486 
indicating that F’s profit actually goes down by implementing the optimal allocation scheme 487 
although the system-wide profit increases. In this case, due to the complete and symmetric 488 
information assumption, an appropriate lump-sum transfer payment from S to F exists such that 489 
the optimal allocation becomes a win-win solution for both parties. As a matter of fact, let   be 490 
the transfer payment, as long as * * **( )F FF DS S DS ek       and * ** *( ) 0S SS DS e F DSk       , the 491 
optimal allocation of S being the responsibility holder makes both S and F better off. Due to the 492 
fact that * ** * ** * *( ) ( )S F S FS DS e S DS e F DS F DSk k         as per the argument leading to Proposition 7, 493 
the existence of such a   is guaranteed. Furthermore, the assumption of complete and symmetric 494 
information allows for establishing this transfer payment as an enforceable clause of the 495 
wholesale contract, which is consistent with the implicit assumption of enforceability based on 496 
transfer payments in Hsueh and Chang (2008) as well. 497 
4.2 Optimal responsibility allocations according to the CSR performance criterion 498 
In the US case, Propositions 1 and 2 clearly indicate that  499 
* *( ) 0 ( ),     for (0, )S US F USy k y k k     .                                         (19) 500 
In addition, for all )/,0( abck  , 501 
 2* 0
2
2d
d 2 ( )
S US
A bc ky
k bc k a k
 
   
. 502 
Then *S USy   increases for all ]2/,0( bck   and decreases for all )/,2/( abcbck  . Thus *S USy   is 503 
unimodal in k  and attains its maximum at 2/* bck y   over )/,0( abc . Note that for ),/(  abck , 504 
* * * *( ) ( / ) ( )S US S US S US yy k y bc a y k    , so *S USy   reaches its global maximum at *yk . Moreover, (19) implies that 505 
),( *ykS  is the unique optimal responsibility allocation in the US case according to the CSR 506 
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performance criterion. 507 
In the DS case, part (i) of Proposition 4 indicates that * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k  for all 2/ak  . For 508 
2/ak  , we have 509 
 2* 0
2
2d
d 2 ( )
S DS
A bc ky
k bc k a k
 
   
. 510 
Then *S DSy   is unimodal in k  and attains its maximum at ** * / 2y yk k bc  . Note that for 2/ak  ,  511 
* * * * *( ) ( / 2) ( / 2) ( )F DS F DS S US S DS yy k y a y a y k      . Thus **( , )yS k is the unique optimal responsibility allocation 512 
according to the CSR performance criterion in the DS case. 513 
In the VN case, from Proposition 5 and 6, it follows that for all ),0( k , 514 
* *0( ) 0 ( )
( )S VN F VN
A k
y k y k
bc k a k 
    , 515 
and 516 
 2* 0
2
d
d ( )
S VN
A bc ky
k bc k a k
 
   
. 517 
Then *S VNy   is unimodal in k  and reaches its maximum at ***yk bc . Note that for all ),0( k ,  518 
* * * ***( ) 0 ( ) ( )F DS S VN S VN yy k y k y k     . Thus ***( , )yS k is the unique optimal responsibility allocation according to 519 
the CSR performance criterion in the VN structure. 520 
Proposition 8: According to the CSR performance criterion, ),( *ykS , **( , )yS k  and ***( , )yS k  are the 521 
unique optimal responsibility allocations in the US, DS, and VN cases, respectively. 522 
Corollary 4: (i) For all ),0( k , * *( ) ( )S US F USy k y k   and * *( ) ( )S VN F VNy k y k  . (ii) There is a unique 523 
# ** *
y y yk k k   such that * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k   for all ],0( #ykk   and * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k   for all ),( #  ykk . 524 
Proof: Part (i) is straightforward. For part (ii), when 2/ak  , since *lim ( ) 0S DSk y k   and 525 
* * * * **( ) ( / 2) ( / 2) ( )F DS F DS S US S DS yy k y a y a y k      , then the unimodality of *S DSy   at **yk  implies that there is a 526 
unique # **
y yk k  such that * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k   for all ],2/( #ykak   and * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k   for all ),( #  ykk . Note 527 
further that * *( ) ( )S DS F DSy k y k  for all 2/ak  . Then part (ii) is proved. This completes the proof of 528 
Corollary 4. 529 
Remark: When the objective is to maximize the channel CSR performance, the current model 530 
demonstrates that the optimal social responsibility allocation is to designate S as the 531 
responsibility holder and entrust it with the (optimally restricted) right to price CSR performance 532 
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in a wholesale price contract under each of the three power structures. Corollary 4 further reveals 533 
that, even if k  is not set at its optimality, a higher CSR performance is always achieved by 534 
assigning S as the responsibility holder in the US and VN cases where S is stronger (US) or 535 
equally powerful (VN). But for the DS structure where the downstream F is more powerful, to 536 
make the weaker player S to be the responsibility holder, an appropriate restriction on the right 537 
( #yk ) has to be imposed; otherwise, the more powerful F will arise as a better choice. Therefore, 538 
Corollary 4 is by and large compatible with the suggestion of Amaeshi et al. (2008) that the more 539 
powerful player should bear social responsibility. 540 
4.3 Conflict between the economic and the CSR performance criteria 541 
Due to the uniqueness of *yk , **yk , ***yk , *ek , **ek  and ***ek , we show the conflict between the social and 542 
economic performance criteria by asserting ** ey kk  , **** ey kk   and ****** ey kk  . 543 
For the US case, as * / 2 /yk bc bc a  , substituting * / 2yk bc  into the expression of *d / dTS US k  in 544 
(15) yields 545 
 *
* 2
0
/2
d 2
0
d 8 2
y
T
S US
k k bc
A bc
k b bc a

 
    . 546 
Given that * *d ( ) / d 0TS US ek k   and * ( )TS US k  reaches its maximum at *ek , ** ey kk  . Furthermore, 547 
the unimodality of *TS US  with respect to k  implies that ** ey kk  . 548 
For the DS and the VN cases, we can similarly ascertain that 549 
 **
* 2
0
/2
d
0
d 2 2
y
T
S DS
k k bc
A
k b bc a

 
    , 550 
and 551 
    0224dd 3
22
0
*
***





bcabc
bcaabcbccA
k bckk
T
VNS
y
. 552 
As * **d ( ) / d 0TS DS ek k   and * ***d ( ) / d 0TS VN ek k  , we have **** ey kk   and ****** ey kk  . 553 
These results are now summarized in Proposition 9. 554 
Proposition 9: Assume that * ** ***, ,  and e e ek k k  are the optimal k  values corresponding to the three 555 
power structures as given in Proposition 7 and * ** ***/ 2,  and y y yk k bc k bc    are the optimal k  556 
values corresponding to the three power structures as given in Proposition 8, then ** ey kk  , **** ey kk  , 557 
and ****** ey kk  . 558 
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Remark: Propositions 7 and 8 indicate that the optimal economic and CSR performances could 559 
be attained by allocating S as the social responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions on k  560 
when each criterion is independently considered as a single objective. Proposition 9 further 561 
points out that these two criteria are inherently in conflict with each other and it is impossible to 562 
achieve both optimality simultaneously under any of the three power structures. In other words, 563 
if the economic performance is to be maximized, the channel CSR performance measured by y 564 
will not achieve its maximum, and vice versa. Proposition 9 highlights the tradeoff between the 565 
economic and CSR performance criteria. This finding sheds significant insights for supply chain 566 
managers (the primary member, in particular) who are under increasing pressure for socially 567 
responsible business practices: it might well be the case of finding a right trade-off between 568 
social and economic performances. Recent research indicates that supply chain managers have 569 
started to address consumer confidence and trust about whether goods and services are provided 570 
without compromising ethical and environmental standards (New 2003). 571 
4.4 Comparisons of economic and social responsibility performance 572 
This subsection compares the channel optimal profits, sales quantities, and CSR performance for 573 
the decentralized system under the three power structures with those of the integrative case with 574 
and without social responsibility considerations. The results are summarized in Proposition 10. 575 
Proposition 10: Let * * and I Nq q  be the optimal sales quantities for the integrative case with and 576 
without considering social responsibility, and ( )( ** eUSS kq  , )( *** eDSS kq  , )( **** eVNS kq  ) and ( )( ** eUSS ky  , 577 
)( *** eDSS ky  , )( **** eVNS ky  ) be the optimal quantity and the CSR performance vectors as per the 578 
optimal social responsibility allocation schemes for the three power structures as given in 579 
Proposition 7. The corresponding profits below are distinguished by their subscripts in a similar 580 
fashion. Then  581 
(i) * * * *( )I S US e Nq q k q  , * * ** *( )I S DS e Nq q k q  , and * * *** *( )I S VN e Nq q k q  ; 582 
(ii) **** )( NeT USSI k   , ***** )( NeT DSSI k   , and ****** )( NeT VNSI k    and 583 
(iii) If 22abc  , then *** )( IeUSS yky  , **** )( IeDSS yky   and ***** )( IeVNS yky  . 584 
Proof: For part (i), we only prove that * * * *( )I S US e Nq q k q   as the other two cases can be shown in 585 
a similar fashion. From part (i) of Proposition 1, for ]/,0( abck  , we have 586 
0)()()()( 2222**   kbcakbcaabcakWkqq USSI . 587 
Since bca 2 , we have 588 
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22 2 2 2 4 6 2 4 2( ) 4 ( ) 3( ) 2 3( ) ( 2 ) 0a a bc a bc a bc abc a bc a abc a a bc              . 589 
Thus the equation 0)( kW  does not have any root over ]/,0( abc , and the convexity of )(kW  590 
and 0)0( 2  bcaW imply that 0)( kW  for all ]/,0( abck  . For ),/(  abck , as * 20( ) / ( )Iq A c bc a   591 
and *S USq    20( ) / (2 )A c bc a  and they share the same numerator with the latter having a larger 592 
denominator, it is obvious * * ( )I S USq q k . Then * * ( )I S USq q k  for all ),0( k . Therefore, * * *( )I S US eq q k . 593 
Note that * /ek a bc a   as per the proof of Proposition 7, Proposition 1(i) yields 594 
* *
* * *0 0
* *
[ ( )]
( )
[ 2 ( )]
e e
S US e N
e e
A bc k a k A
q k q
bb bc k a k
     .  595 
For part (ii), for the same reason, we only prove * * * *( )I S US e Nk     . From (6), ),( yqT  is strictly 596 
concave in ),( yq . Then ),(),( *** yqyq TIITI   for any ),(),( ** II yqyq  . From part (i), * * *( )I S US eq q k , 597 
hence * * *( )I S US ek   . Furthermore, the optimality of *ek  implies that * * * 20( ) ( ) / (2 )S US e F USk k A b     = *N . 598 
For part (iii), we first prove *** )( IeUSS yky  . Note that 599 
*
2
0
2
0
2
0
00****
)(2222/2
                 
)2(2)2(2
)2/()(max)(
I
USSUSS
k
eUSS
y
abc
aA
abc
aA
abcbc
aA
abca
aA
abc
A
bcykyky

   600 
where the first equality is implied in the deduction of Proposition 8, the second and the third 601 
inequalities are due to 22abc   and 2abc  , respectively. 602 
**** )( IeDSS yky   can be proved in a similar fashion. Now we prove ***** )( IeVNS yky  . By 22abc  , 603 
we have 0)2()( 2  bcaaaH  ( ( )H   is introduced in Eq. (18)). Since ( / 2) 0H a  ,  ***( ) 0eH k  , 604 
and ( )H   is a decreasing function as per the earlier discussions, it is ascertained that ),2/(*** aake  . 605 
Further, the deduction of Proposition 8 implies that )(* ky VNS  increases in k  in ),0( bc . Since 606 
***
ek a , we have 607 
* *** * *0 0
2( ) ( )S VN e S VN I
A a A ay k y a y
bc bc a 
     608 
Proposition 10 is thus proved. 609 
Remark: Proposition 10 clearly demonstrates that, with the presence of CSR, the integrative 610 
system-wide optimal profit and sales quantity are not attainable via a decentralized system 611 
regardless of how CSR is allocated between the two members (S and F) due to double-612 
marginalization. Nevertheless, it does point out that the channel profit and sales can be improved 613 
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by implementing the optimal social responsibility allocation schemes in the decentralized system 614 
compared to the integrative case without considering social responsibility. An intuitive 615 
interpretation is that the sales are improved because the market demand curve is shifted upwards 616 
by socially responsible activities (Propositions 1, 3 and 5 show that equilibrium y  is strictly 617 
greater than 0, while in the case without CSR, y  is always equal to 0), leading to a higher 618 
system-wide profit. This enhanced profitability, as discussed at the end of Section 4.1, provides a 619 
basis for both parties to improve their individual profitability either automatically or via an 620 
appropriate credible transfer payment. Proposition 10 thus helps to explain the recent trend in the 621 
business world: more and more companies (often primary firms of global supply chains) commit 622 
resources to socially and environmentally responsible activities such as establishing and 623 
implementing certain codes of conduct as a means to eventually improving their economic 624 
performance10. And the prediction of efficiency improvement justifies the empirical findings that 625 
CSR is positively related to corporate financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2001; Orlitzky 626 
et al. 2003).  627 
In the proof of Proposition 10 (iii), the assumption of 22abc   is introduced together with 628 
2abc  . The following arguments are furnished to justify these two assumptions: (1) For a given 629 
market demand characterized by a  and b , the impact of the CSR investment on the supplier’s 630 
cost should be restricted to a reasonable range (i.e. bacba /2/ 22  ); (2) the upper bound 631 
assumption of 22abc   ensures that the optimal k ’s under all three power structures (i.e. *ek , **ek  632 
and ***ek ) is less than a. As such, by implementing the optimal allocation scheme, the firm’s unit 633 
profit margin increases in y  (as ( )a k y  appears in the profit function (4)), leading to the firm’s 634 
interests in the supplier’s CSR investments (otherwise the firm always prefers to 0y  because 635 
any increase in y will result in a decrease in its unit profit margin). 636 
5 Discussions 637 
In Section 4, when the optimal allocation decision is considered, it is assumed that the 638 
responsibility holder simultaneously determines k along with the other variable. This section 639 
examines the case that k  is first determined by the responsibility holder and then other decision 640 
variables are subsequently decided as per each of the six aforesaid games. 641 
                                                 
10 For example, Cone/Roper Cause Related Trends Report (1999) shows that nearly 50% of larger corporations have programs 
associated with social issues. 
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Corresponding to the six games, S-US, F-US, S-DS, F-DS, S-VN, and F-VN, defined in 642 
Section 2, we now modify them by assuming that k  is first determined by the responsibility 643 
holder, followed by other decision variables. The modified games are denoted as SS-US, FF-US, 644 
SS-DS, FF-DS, SS-VN and FF-VN games, where SS and FF indicate that the supplier and the 645 
firm are, respectively, assigned as the responsibility holder and decide k  prior to other decision 646 
variables. Then we change the subscripts of the equilibrium and optimal decision variables in 647 
Sections 2-4 in a similar fashion to reflect the corresponding modified scenarios. For example, 648 
*T
USSS   and *T USFF  represent the equilibrium supply chain system profits of the SS-US and FF-US 649 
games, respectively. 650 
      According to Zabel’s (1970) method, it is easy to check that the equilibrium variables for the 651 
SS-US and FF-DS cases are identical to those in the S-US and F-DS cases, respectively. 652 
Especially, we have ** T USST USSS    and ** T DSFT DSFF    for all k . Now let us turn to the other four 653 
scenarios. First, the equilibrium variables are derived as follows. 654 
(I) The FF-US game: 655 
 (i) if 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are 656 
kk USFF * ; )(2
0*
kakbc
kA
y USFF  ; )](2[
)]([0*
kakbcb
kakbcA
q USFF 
 ; 657 
)](2[2
22
0*
kakbcb
kAS
USFF   ; 2
22
0*
)](2[2
)]([
kakbcb
kakbcAF
USFF 
  ; 



  2
222
0*
)](2[
)]([
)(22 kakbc
kakbc
kakbc
k
b
AT
USFF . 658 
      (ii) if 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are 659 
2
* ak USFF  ; 20* 2 abc
aA
y USFF  ; )2(2
)4(
2
2
0*
abcb
abcA
q USFF 
 ; 660 
)2(4 2
22
0*
abcb
aAS
USFF   ; 22
222
0*
)2(8
)4(
abcb
abcAF
USFF 
  ; 22
42222
0*
)2(8
)416(
abcb
abcacbAT
USFF 
  . 661 
(II) The SS-DS game: 662 
(i) if 2/bck  , the equilibrium variables are 663 
kk DSSS * ; )(2
0*
kakbc
kA
y DSSS  ; )(2
0*
kakbc
cA
q DSSS  ; 664 
2
22
0*
)](2[2 kakbc
kcAS
DSSS   ; )](2[2
2
0*
kakbc
cAF
DSSS   ; 2
22
0*
)](2[2
)32(
kakbc
kakbccAT
DSSS 
  . 665 
      (ii) if 2/bck  , the equilibrium variables are 666 
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2
* bck DSSS  ;  abcAy DSSS  22 0* ;  abcbc cAq DSSS  22 0* ; 667 
 2
2
0*
28 abc
cAS
DSSS 
  ;  abcbc cAF DSSS   222
2
0* ;   2
2
0*
28
225
abcb
bcabcAT
DSSS 
  . 668 
   (III) The SS-VN game: 669 
(i) if bck  , the equilibrium variables are 670 
kk VNSS * ; )(
0*
kakbc
kA
y VNSS  ; )(
0*
kakbc
cA
q VNSS  ; 671 
2
22
0*
)]([2 kakbc
kcAS
VNSS   ; )]([2
2
0*
kakbc
cAF
VNSS   ; 2
22
0*
)]([2
)2(
kakbc
kakbccAT
VNSS 
  . 672 
      (ii) if bck  , the equilibrium variables are 673 
bck VNSS * ; 
abc
Ay VNSS  2
0* ; 
bcabc
cA
q VNSS  2
0* ; 674 
 2
2
0*
22 abc
cAS
VNSS 
  ;  bcabc cAF VNSS   22
2
0* ;   2
2
0*
22
3
abcb
bcabcAT
VNSS 
  . 675 
   (IV) The FF-VN game: 676 
(i) if 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are 677 
kk VNFF * ; )(
0*
kakbc
kA
y VNFF  ; )(
0*
kakbc
cA
q VNFF  ; 678 
2
22
0*
)]([2 kakbc
kcAS
VNFF   ; )]([2
2
0*
kakbc
cAF
VNFF   ; 2
22
0*
)]([2
)2(
kakbc
kakbccAT
VNFF 
  . 679 
      (ii) if 2/ak  , the equilibrium variables are 680 
2
* ak VNSS  ; 20* 4
2
abc
aA
y VNFF  ; 2
0*
4
4
abc
cA
q VNFF  ; 681 
 22
22
0*
4
2
abc
caAS
VNFF  
; 
2
2
0*
4
2
abc
cAF
VNFF   ;  22
22
0*
4
8
abc
bcAT
VNFF  
. 682 
By examining the equilibrium variables for the six modified games, we can establish 683 
Proposition 11 as follows.  684 
Proposition 11: For the modified games where k  is determined by the responsibility holder 685 
before the other decision variables q and y  are furnished by F and S, respectively, it remains true 686 
for the optimal responsibility allocation schemes derived in Propositions 7 and 8 under each of 687 
the three power structures as well as the comparative statics established in Propositions 9 and 10. 688 
Proof: We first verify Proposition 7. For the FF-US game, we have 689 
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.                           (20) 690 
Clearly, )()()( *** kkk T USSST USST USFF    for all / 2 /k a a bc a   . Recall that 4( ) 2F k ak    691 
2 3 2 2 22 ( )a k bc a bc k ab c    is introduced in analyzing the US case in Section 4.1, it is easy to 692 
verify that 02/)()2/( 2  abcabcaF . Then )(* kT USS  increases at 2/ak  . By the definition of *ek  693 
in Section 4.1, we have )()2/()2/()( ***** kaak T USFFT USFFT USSeT USS   , where the last inequality 694 
is derived due to the fact that the supply chain system profit function (20) increases over )2/,0( a  695 
and remains constant for  [ / 2, )k a  . Thus, ),( *ekS  remains the optimal responsibility allocation 696 
for the US case according to the economic performance criterion, even if k  is first decided by 697 
the firm. In a similar way, we can also confirm that for all k , 698 
)()()( ******* kkk T DSSSe
T
DSSSe
T
DSS   ,                                        (21) 699 
)()()( ********* kkk T VNSSe
T
VNSSe
T
VNS    and )()2/()( ****** kak T VNFFT VNFFeT VNS   .              (22) 700 
(21) and (22) imply that ),( **ekS  and ),( ***ekS  are the optimal responsibility allocations for 701 
the DS and VN cases, respectively. 702 
Now we prove that Proposition 8 remains true. We can easily determine that for all k , 703 
)()2/()2/()( ***** kyayayky USFFUSFFUSSyUSS   ,                                   (23) 704 
* ** * ** *( ) ( ) ( )S DS y SS DS y SS DSy k y k y k    ,                                      (24) 705 
* *** * *** *( ) ( ) ( )S VN y SS VN y SS VNy k y k y k     and * *** * *( ) ( / 2) ( )S VN y FF VN FF VNy k y a y k    .             (25) 706 
Then (23), (24) and (25) imply that ),( *ykS , ),( **ykS  and ),( ***ykS  are the optimal 707 
responsibility allocations for the US, DS and VN cases, respectively. 708 
Finally, since the assumption that k  is first decided by the corresponding responsibility 709 
holder does not have any impact on the optimal responsibility allocations, Propositions 9 and 10 710 
follow immediately. Proposition 11 is thus proved. 711 
Remark: Two points are worth mentioning here. First, as the responsibility holder’s k  decision 712 
induces the subsequent US, DS or VN game, it has to take into account the subsequent 713 
equilibrium variables due to backward induction. This consideration helps to avoid the extreme 714 
case of not sharing the CSR investment at all. Second, Proposition 11 shows that Propositions 7-715 
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10 are robust to the change of the sequence of determining k  as long as k  is appropriately 716 
specified.  717 
To illustrate the shapes of and relationships among the channel profit functions, a numerical 718 
example has been developed for the US case as shown in Table 1, and the resulting graph is 719 
depicted in Fig. 1 (As a matter of fact, the relative relationships among the curves in Fig. 1 can 720 
be theoretically confirmed). Fig. 1 clearly points out the optimal allocation at *ek  (Proposition 721 
11). If k  is not set at its optimality *ek  and k is offered by the responsibility holder ahead of the 722 
other two decision variables, q and y, Fig. 1 also furnishes the ranges of k  values within which 723 
the profit is indifferent ( 0 / 2k a  ), the channel profit is higher if S is the responsibility holder 724 
( '/ 2 ea k k  ), or it is better to entrust F as the responsibility holder ( 'ek k ). Fig. 1 also 725 
schematically confirms Proposition 7 and Corollary 1 when k  is not set at its optimality and k is 726 
determined with the responsibility holder’s other decision variable simultaneously. For the DS 727 
and VN cases, similar numerical experiments and graphical representations can be obtained and 728 
are omitted here for the sake of space. 729 
Table 1. Channel profit for the S-US (SS-US), F-US, FF-US cases 730 
k  
(3 5) / 2bc a   (3 5) / 2bc a   
 * *T TS US SS US    *TF US  *TFF US   * *T TS US SS US   *TF US  *TFF US  
0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333
0.3 0.309299 0.25 0.309299 0.503344 0.333333 0.503344
0.6 0.336389 0.25 0.323696 0.626298 0.333333 0.604167
0.9 0.322674 0.25 0.323696 0.584883 0.333333 0.604167
1.2 0.297115 0.25 0.323696 0.499847 0.333333 0.604167
1.5 0.275543 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
1.8 0.259758 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
2.1 0.248293 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
2.4 0.239755 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
2.7 0.237387 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
3.0 0.237387 0.25 0.323696 0.4375 0.333333 0.604167
Parameter values are set as follows: 0 0 0 0 0 01, 2, 1;w c a A a w       731 
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For the (3 5) / 2bc a   case, 0.8, 2, 1a b c   ; For the (3 5) / 2bc a   case, 1, 1.5, 1a b c   . 732 
 733 
6 Concluding Remarks 734 
Social responsibility allocation is considered in a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a 735 
downstream firm F and an upstream supplier S bound by a wholesale price contract. The CSR 736 
performance of the supply chain is assumed to be a global variable y and the related cost is 737 
incurred only by S and is expected to be shared with F via the wholesale price contract that is 738 
characterized by a parameter k. With the duality of responsibility and rights, the allocation is 739 
conceived as a two-dimensional vector. The first dimension assigns a supply chain member as 740 
the responsibility holder and entrusts it with the right to price the CSR performance in the 741 
contract. The second dimension specifies an upper bound k  for the key parameter k in the 742 
wholesale price contract, which effectively places a restriction on the right of the responsibility 743 
holder. The power structure of the supply chain is captured as the Stackelberg leader-follower 744 
relationship. Different combinations of responsibility holder assignment and power structures 745 
lead to six distinct games and their corresponding equilibriums are derived accordingly in 746 
Propositions 1 through 6. By analyzing the equilibriums as per the methodology of comparative 747 
institutional analysis, the following key results are obtained:  748 
(1) Under each of the three power structures, the optimal social responsibility allocation 749 
scheme is always to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions 750 
on k  based on both the economic and the CSR performance criteria (Propositions 7 and 8). 751 
When the economic performance drifts away from its maximum, such restrictions are mandatory 752 
Fig. 1 The Comparison of equilibrium profits (the US case) 
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for the supplier to be the responsible holder under all the three power structures with a minor 753 
exception (Corollaries 1-3). Otherwise, if the cap on k is set at a level that exceeds a threshold, F 754 
will turn out to be a better responsibility holder for the channel profit. In the model setting in this 755 
research, the investment for ensuring the global social performance y incurs by S only. Therefore, 756 
the optimal allocation scheme of entrusting S with the right of pricing y tends to support 757 
arguments based on the principles of corporate legal personality and separate existence of a 758 
corporation. On the other hand, if the maximal CSR performance is not attained, to make the 759 
supplier a better responsibility holder, an appropriate restriction on the right is only required for 760 
the DS case when the supplier is a relatively weaker player (Corollary 4). From this perspective, 761 
this result is compatible with the suggestion of Amaeshi et al. (2008) that more powerful 762 
members should be held accountable. 763 
(2) Under all the three power structures, it is impossible to achieve optimal economic and 764 
CSR performance simultaneously. Inherent conflict exists between these two criteria when social 765 
responsibility allocation decisions are made (Proposition 9). This result highlights the need for 766 
finding an appropriate tradeoff between these two criteria for supply chain managers who are 767 
faced with increasing social responsibility pressures in practice, as observed by New (2003). 768 
(3) Under all the three power structures, the integrative channel profit is not attainable due 769 
to double-marginalization, but the system-wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal 770 
social responsibility allocation schemes compared to the case without considering social 771 
responsibility at all (Proposition 10). This result helps us understand the recent trend of investing 772 
in social responsibility in the business world, and justifies the empirical findings that CSR is 773 
positively related to corporate financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2001; Orlitzky et al. 774 
2003). 775 
Finally, Proposition 11 shows that Propositions 7-10 are robust relative to the sequence 776 
change of determining k  (i.e., k  is first offered by the responsibility holder) as long as k  is 777 
appropriately specified.  778 
The current model assumes that information on both the cost parameter of social 779 
responsibility investment and the parameter of the market impact of CSR performance is 780 
symmetric for the supplier and the firm. In reality, the supplier may possess more information on 781 
the cost parameter while the firm is likely to understand the market impact better. This 782 
information asymmetry raises a new question: How do moral hazard and/or adverse selection 783 
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influence social responsibility allocation? Another potential extension of this research is to 784 
consider other well-known contract structures such as the buy back contract, the revenue sharing 785 
contract, the quantity flexibility contract, to name a few. Still another consideration is to explore 786 
the situation that both the supplier and firm incur their individual CSR costs. These open 787 
questions warrant further investigations.  788 
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